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INTRODUCTION 
Social justice captivated the national political discourse in the first 
year and a half of the Obama Administration as the country focused on 
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the issue of access to health care for the millions of Americans who 
cannot afford health insurance.  The passage of major health care–
reform legislation raises the following questions:  What other social jus-
tice initiatives may be on the horizon?  Might the country turn its atten-
tion to access to justice for indigent litigants in the civil justice system? 
In August 2006, the American Bar Association (ABA) House of 
Delegates passed Resolution 112A, encouraging legislatures to “pro-
vide legal counsel as a matter of right at public expense to low income 
persons in those categories of adversarial proceedings where basic 
human needs are at stake.”1  This proposal embodies the “Civil Gideon” 
movement, which endeavors to achieve a right to appointed counsel 
for indigent litigants in the civil context, similar to the Sixth Amend-
ment right in criminal matters the Supreme Court articulated in Gideon 
v. Wainwright.2  Calls to expand the right to appointed legal counsel 
stem from the many legal needs left systemically unmet3 and the cur-
rent legal aid system’s inability to satisfy indigent litigants’ demands 
for legal assistance.4  Many people proceed without representation in 
civil cases, putting themselves at a significant disadvantage when pitted 
against sophisticated opposing counsel who are experienced in our  
adversarial system of justice.  Adverse outcomes are significantly more 
likely for unrepresented litigants.5 
Disparate outcomes for unrepresented litigants resulting from their 
lack of counsel present a fundamental challenge to a justice system 
founded on the principle emblazoned on the Supreme Court’s marble 
portico:  “Equal Justice Under Law.”  In response to ABA Resolution 
112A, numerous state and local bar associations passed similar resolu-
tions and established task forces with the goal of expanding the right to 
 
1 AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 112A, at 1 
(2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/downloads/06A112A.pdf. 
2 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963). 
3 See CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVS. & THE PUB., AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL NEEDS AND 
CIVIL JUSTICE 3-4 (1994), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/ 
sclaid/legalneedstudy.pdf (finding significant legal needs in a survey of low- and  
moderate-income households); see also LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUS-
TICE GAP IN AMERICA 13-18 (2009), available at http://www.lsc.gov/pdfs/documenting_ 
the_ justice_gap_in_america_2009.pdf  (noting that numerous state organizations rep-
licating the ABA survey often found more unmet need).  
4 See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 3, at 12 (reporting that legal aid programs turn 
away one potential client for every client that their resources enable them to represent). 
5 See generally Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon:  What Exist-
ing Data Reveal About When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 46-66 (2010) 
(surveying studies finding that lack of counsel is a significant variable affecting outcomes 
in housing, family, small-claims, and administrative agency actions). 
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counsel in certain civil matters.6  Notable among these state efforts, the 
California legislature—even in the face of the state’s fiscal woes7—
recently passed the Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act, which funds pilot 
programs through which lawyers “shall be appointed to represent low-
income parties in civil matters involving critical issues affecting basic 
human needs.”8  Following on the heels of California, the American Bar 
Association adopted the ABA Model Access Act, intended to “assist  
interested legislators” to “establish[] a statutory right to counsel in  
those basic areas of human need identified in the 2006 Resolution 
and . . . provid[e] a mechanism for implementing that right.”9 
Despite the Civil Gideon movement’s progress, setting Gideon as the 
movement’s goal may not be ideal.  Many commentators10 and practi-
tioners11 lament that Gideon has not fulfilled its promise of providing 
competent counsel to indigent criminal defendants.  One oft-cited 
failure is that representation by the defendant’s appointed counsel is 
still completely inadequate, in part because of the high threshold to 
find counsel ineffective on appellate review.12  Conscience-shocking 
examples abound: 
 
6 See Paul Marvy & Laura Klein Abel, Current Developments in Advocacy to Expand the 
Civil Right to Counsel, 25 TOURO L. REV. 131, 132-44 (2009) (identifying bar association 
efforts in Alaska, California, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hamp-
shire, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington). 
7 See Jennifer Steinhauer, New Year but No Relief for Strapped States, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 
2010, at A15 (reporting on California’s projected budget deficit of twenty billion dollars).   
8 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68651(a) (West Supp. 2010). 
9 AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 104, at 6 
(2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/downloads/104_ 
Revised_FINAL_Aug_2010.pdf. 
10 See, e.g., Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes:  The Empty Promise of 
the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 
627 (1986) (detailing how the “severity of the underfunding of those agencies provid-
ing defense counsel to the indigent seriously endangers the sixth amendment guaran-
tee to effective assistance of counsel”). 
11 See, e.g., STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEF., AM. BAR ASS’N,  
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE:  AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE  
41-45 (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/ 
brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf (recommending reforms including funding for indigent 
defense at parity with that for prosecution, federal financial assistance, establishment of 
state oversight organizations, and a bar on excessive public defender workloads).  
12 See, e.g., David Cole, Gideon v. Wainwright and Strickland v. Washington:  Broken 
Promises (“By accepting a patently unacceptable status quo as the constitutional base-
line for ‘effective’ lawyering, the Court in Strickland practically guaranteed that indi-
gent defendants would obtain effective assistance only through luck, not through a 
state-guaranteed right.”), in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 101, 104 (Carol S. Steiker 
ed., 2006). 
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Courts have declined to find ineffective assistance where defense counsel 
slept during portions of the trial, where counsel used heroin and co-
caine throughout the trial, . . .  where counsel stated prior to trial that he 
was not prepared on the law or facts of the case, and where counsel ap-
pointed in a capital case could not name a single Supreme Court deci-
sion on the death penalty.
13
 
Critics argue that the low standard for effectiveness of counsel,  
which the Supreme Court established in Strickland v. Washington,14 not 
only vitiates the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel for many criminal defendants, but also provides less incentive 
for states to fund indigent defense services adequately.  This com-
pounds the problem of inadequate representation by overburdening 
the public defender system.15 
Based on the experience under Gideon, legislative efforts to ex-
pand the right to appointed counsel in certain categories of civil cases 
may not be sufficient to guarantee indigent litigants the right to effec-
tive assistance.  This Comment evaluates the standards that appellate 
courts might use to judge ineffective assistance of counsel in the civil 
context in light of current efforts to expand representation in civil 
cases.16  The bulk of Civil Gideon scholarship focuses on how a right to 
appointed counsel like that announced in Gideon may be achieved in 
the civil context17 without addressing whether Gideon is a desirable 
goal.  Laura K. Abel, Deputy Director of the Justice Program at the 
Brennan Center for Justice, provides a rare exception to this general 
trend in an article listing the lessons that the Civil Gideon movement 
 
13 Id. at 114 (footnotes omitted) (citing People v. Tippins, 570 N.Y.S.2d 581, 582-
83 (App. Div. 1991) (sleeping); People v. Badia, 552 N.Y.S.2d 439, 440 (App. Div. 
1990) (drug use); People v. Dalton, 529 N.Y.S.2d 927, 927 (App. Div. 1988) (unpre-
pared); Birt v. Montgomery, 725 F.2d 587, 601 (11th Cir. 1984), as construed in Stephen 
B. Bright, Essay, Counsel for the Poor:  The Death Penalty Not for the Worst Crime But for the 
Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1839 (1994) (inability to cite cases)). 
14 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
15 See Cole, supra note 12, at 114 (“[B]ecause the Court’s standard uncritically ac-
cepts the status quo as ‘effective,’ it creates no incentive for states to improve on exist-
ing standards of legal representation for the poor.”). 
16 This Comment focuses on the standards by which to judge ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims, rather than the procedure for bringing such claims.  Thus, it does 
not discuss whether such claims should be brought on direct appeal, collaterally 
through postconviction review, or—unique to the civil context—via civil procedure 
mechanisms, such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which allows judgments to 
be set aside for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” or “any other 
reason that justifies relief.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1), (6). 
17 See generally 2006 Edward V. Sparer Symposium, Civil Gideon:  Creating a Constitu-
tional Right to Counsel in the Civil Context, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 501 (2006). 
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can learn from Gideon itself.18  This Comment evaluates and expands 
on a footnote in Deputy Director Abel’s article identifying trends in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence in the criminal context that may signal 
an opportunity to consider alternatives to the difficulties the Strickland 
standard presents.19  Existing literature addressing ineffective assis-
tance of counsel in the civil context specifically singles out the class of 
civil cases where states most commonly appoint counsel to indigent 
litigants:  parental rights terminations.20  This Comment adds to such 
literature by examining alternative approaches to the establishment of 
a civil right to counsel in light of the broader Civil Gideon movement 
and recent developments in Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
This Comment is divided into four Parts.  In order to assess the 
standards for ineffective assistance of counsel, it is first important to 
understand the most likely ways to achieve a Civil Gideon.  Therefore, 
Part I provides background on Civil Gideon efforts and concludes that 
legislation, as opposed to litigation, is the most likely avenue for achiev-
ing a meaningful civil right to counsel.  Part II examines a potential pit-
fall for the Civil Gideon movement in light of the havoc that the Strick-
land standard has wreaked on the right established by Gideon.  Part III 
assesses the foundations for recognizing a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel for civil litigants against counsel appointed through Civil 
Gideon statutes.  Finally, Part IV evaluates potential standards for ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel, concluding that appellate courts ought to 
 
18 See Laura K. Abel, A Right to Counsel in Civil Cases:  Lessons From Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 527, 530 (2006) (“It is imperative that any 
exploration of the scope of a civil right to counsel be based on an understanding of 
the experience with the criminal right to counsel.  This article attempts to draw some 
useful lessons from that experience.”). 
19 See id. at 547 n.176. 
20 See Susan Calkins, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Parental-Rights Termination 
Cases:  The Challenge for Appellate Courts, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 179, 184-99 (2004) 
(evaluating the standards for ineffective assistance of counsel in the Supreme Court 
and the states for parental rights termination cases); William Wesley Patton, Standards 
of Appellate Review for Denial of Counsel and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Child Protec-
tion and Parental Severance Cases, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 195, 227-31 (1996) (examining al-
ternatives to Strickland’s prejudice prong in parental rights termination and child pro-
tection cases); cf. Robert S. Catz & Nancy Lee Firak, The Right to Appointed Counsel in 
Quasi-Criminal Cases:  Towards an Effective Assistance of Counsel Standard, 19 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 397, 467 (1984) (advocating, pre-Strickland, the adoption of an “objective 
standard of constitutionally effective assistance of counsel” in civil cases where liberty 
interests are at stake, including parental rights termination cases). 
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adopt a professional-guidelines-based approach that subjects an attor-
ney’s performance to stricter review than Strickland.21 
I.  AVENUES FOR ESTABLISHING A CIVIL GIDEON 
In his landmark opinion in Gideon, Justice Black concluded that 
“in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into 
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial un-
less counsel is provided for him.  This seems . . . to be an obvious 
truth.”22  With these words, the Supreme Court overruled Betts v. Brady,23 
which held that the due process guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments did not necessarily require the state to provide attorneys 
to criminal defendants who could not afford them.24  Three decades 
before Gideon, the Court used “reason and reflection”25 to arrive at a 
similar conclusion in the infamous Scottsboro trial, and such reasoning 
appears no less applicable in the civil context:  “Even the intelligent and 
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of 
law.”26  Gideon, however, grounded the right to counsel in the Sixth 
Amendment, which specifically addresses “all criminal prosecutions.”27  
This Part examines judicial and legislative avenues for establishing a 
Civil Gideon and concludes that, between these strategies, legislative ef-
forts are the most likely avenue for progress toward a Civil Gideon. 
A.  Judicial Strategies 
There are three possible judicial strategies for achieving a Civil 
Gideon:  federal due process claims, federal equal protection claims, 
and state constitutional claims.  Although a Civil Gideon would suggest 
 
21 Throughout this Comment, “stricter standard than Strickland” refers to a standard 
that is stricter in scrutinizing the lawyers’ conduct by requiring that conduct to reach a 
higher threshold to be deemed effective, not a harder test for the claimant to meet. 
22 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
23 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon, 372 U.S. 335. 
24 See id. at 471 (“[W]e are unable to say that the concept of due process incorpo-
rated in the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the States, whatever may be their own 
views, to furnish counsel in every such case.”). 
25 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. 
26 Id. at 345 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).  In Betts v. Brady, 
the Court recognized that the logic in favor of a per se right to counsel is the same in 
the civil context as in the criminal context.  See Abel, supra note 18, at 530-31 (“The 
Court also noted that, were it accepted, the logic of Betts’ argument would require the 
appointment of counsel not only in criminal cases, but in civil cases too.” (citing Betts, 
316 U.S. at 473)). 
27 See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339-45; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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a right to appointed counsel in a broad array of civil cases, the cases 
discussed in this Section are primarily parental rights termination cas-
es because the interest at stake is among the weightiest in the civil jus-
tice system, making such cases especially compelling for developing a 
right to appointed counsel in civil cases.28  These litigation efforts, 
however, face major hurdles that may prevent them from effectively 
establishing a Civil Gideon. 
1.  Federal Due Process Claims 
The forcefulness with which the Gideon Court identified the right 
to counsel as a “fundamental right,” applicable to the states under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, made the Due Process Clause a natural ave-
nue by which to achieve a Civil Gideon.29  The Due Process Clauses of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect “liberty” interests with 
two separate guarantees—“procedural due process” and “substantive 
due process”30—both of which may be implicated in civil cases with  
indigent litigants.  When “governmental decisions . . . deprive individu-
als of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests,” procedural due process places  
limitations on the process the government may use in order to ensure 
individuals have the “opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and 
in a meaningful manner.’”31  The argument that indigent defendants 
are denied due process of law when they forfeit important rights in civil 
cases as a consequence of the absence of counsel fits well within the 
language of procedural due process.  Substantive due process, which 
inquires into whether the government has sufficient justification to take 
away an individual’s “fundamental rights,” may also be implicated.  For 
example, the Court has recognized that a parent’s “‘care, custody, and 
management of his or her children’” is a fundamental right for the 
 
28 See Steven D. Schwinn, The Right to Counsel on Appeal:  Civil Douglas, 15 TEMP. 
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 603, 606 (2006) (“Because of the weight of the interest, paren-
tal rights and cases seeking to terminate parental rights have been the primary focus of 
Civil Gideon litigation.”). 
29 See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-43 (“We think the Court in Betts was wrong . . . in 
concluding that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel is not one of these fun-
damental rights.  Ten years before Betts v. Brady, this Court . . . had unequivocally de-
clared that ‘the right to the aid of counsel is of this fundamental character.’” (quoting 
Powell, 287 U.S. at 68)). 
30 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 545 (3d ed. 2006). 
31 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976) (quoting Amstrong v. Manzo, 
380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). 
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purposes of the Due Process Clause.32  The Court, however, largely 
precluded due process as a means of achieving a Civil Gideon in Lassiter 
v. Department of Social Services, a parental rights termination appeal.33 
Civil Gideon’s fate under the federal Due Process Clause could not 
have hinged on a less sympathetic case.34  In a prior proceeding, Abby 
Gail Lassiter lost custody of her infant child to the Durham County 
Department of Social Services for failing to provide proper medical 
care after her mother complained that Lassiter left the children “with 
her for days without providing money or food while she was gone.”35  
Between the time of that adjudication and when the state terminated 
Lassiter’s parental rights, Lassiter was convicted of and imprisoned for 
second-degree murder after using a butcher knife to repeatedly stab 
her victim.36  In the two years since the state took custody, Lassiter had 
not been in contact with the Department of Social Services and had 
not seen her child, “except for one prearranged visit and a chance 
meeting on the street.”37 
On appeal, the Supreme Court denied Lassiter’s claim that the 
“Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitled her to the 
assistance of counsel.”38  Instead, the Court established a case-by-case 
determination for when due process requires appointment of counsel 
based on the three factors identified in Mathews v. Eldridge,39 the seminal 
case establishing the test to determine what process is required under 
the Due Process Clause.  The three factors are “the private interests at 
stake, the government’s interest, and the risk that the procedures used 
will lead to erroneous decisions.”40  The Court, however, subjected the 
application of the Mathews factors in this context to a presumption—
drawn from post-Gideon cases that had limited Gideon’s ambitious 
scope—“that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only 
 
32 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982) (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)). 
33 See 452 U.S. at 31 (holding that due process does not require “the appointment 
of counsel in every parental termination proceeding”). 
34 See, e.g., Michael Millemann, The State Due Process Justification for a Right to Counsel 
in Some Civil Cases, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 733, 739 (2006) (“Lassiter ’s facts, 
at least the facts that the Court emphasized in its opinion, made it a bad test case.”).  
35 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 20, 23.  
36 Id. at 20 n.1. 
37 Id. at 22 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
38 See id. at 24, 33 (concluding that the trial court did not err by failing to appoint 
Lassiter counsel). 
39 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). 
40 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 
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when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty.”41  An in-
digent civil litigant who wishes to claim a due process right to ap-
pointed counsel must not only demonstrate a favorable balance under 
the Mathews factors, but a balance sufficiently weighty to overcome this 
presumption.42  By setting the bar so high for indigent civil litigants to 
be appointed counsel under the Due Process Clause, the Court not 
only instituted the type of case-by-case judgments found to be defi-
cient in the criminal context by Gideon but also ensured that very few 
civil litigants could meet the standard for constitutionally required 
appointment of counsel. 
There are many convincing arguments that Lassiter should be 
overruled.  Just as the Court eventually overruled Betts after twenty-one 
years, the time for the Court to overrule Lassiter is overdue because 
the factors which led the Court to overrule Betts now exist with respect 
to Lassiter, including “widespread academic condemnation” and the 
impracticalities of case-by-case determinations.43  Among the academic 
critics, Laura Abel identifies those who argue that Lassiter undermines 
the judicial system’s legitimacy,44 those who challenge the particular 
balance struck between the Mathews factors by the Lassister Court,45 
and those who point out “that the United States is anomalous in fail-
ing to guarantee a right to counsel in important civil cases.”46 
 
41 Id. at 26-27.  For post-Gideon decisions limiting the scope of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel in criminal cases, see Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979), 
which limited the right to appointed counsel to cases where the defendant is “sen-
tenced to a term of imprisonment,” and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973), 
which rejected a per se right to counsel at probation revocation hearings. 
42 See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31 (“The dispositive question . . . is whether the three 
Eldridge factors, when weighed against the presumption that there is no right to ap-
pointed counsel in the absence of at least a potential deprivation of physical liberty, 
suffice to rebut that presumption . . . .”). 
43 Abel, supra note 18, at 531-32. 
44 Id. (“‘[W]here crucial interests are at issue, legal standards are imprecise and 
subjective, proceedings are formal and adversarial, and resources between the parties 
are grossly imbalanced,’” undermining “‘the legitimacy of the justice system.’” (quot-
ing Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1799 (2001))). 
45 Id. at 532 (attributing to Judge Sweet the broad proposition that the third factor 
dictates appointment “‘whenever in forma pauperis status exists. . . . As every trial judge 
knows, the task of determining the correct legal outcome is rendered almost impossi-
ble without effective counsel.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Robert W. Sweet, Civil 
Gideon and Confidence in a Just Society, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 503, 505 (1998))). 
46 Id. (citing Paul Marvy & Debra Gardner, A Civil Right to Counsel for the Poor, 
HUM. RTS., Summer 2005, at 8, 8); see also Earl Johnson, Jr., Will Gideon’s Trumpet Sound 
a New Melody?  The Globalization of Constitutional Values and Its Implications for a Right to 
Equal Justice in Civil Cases, 2 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 201, 202 (2003) (“The European 
Court [of Human Rights] reached the opposite conclusion [to Lassiter], holding the 
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While the recognition of foreign and international law in recent 
Supreme Court opinions may suggest a willingness by the Court to 
recognize the arguments of these latter critics,47 two factors will likely 
frustrate any effort to mount a direct assault on Lassiter.  First, just as 
Lassiter came well after the high-water mark of progressive judicial 
opinions to which Gideon belonged, the continued conservative shift 
within the judiciary makes it unlikely that a majority of the Court will 
look favorably on a ruling that would impose significant new duties 
and costs on states.  Second, in the absence of a Civil Gideon, legal re-
formers have developed other mechanisms for aiding pro se litigants 
that may complicate a clear balancing of the third Mathews factor, “the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation.”48  For example, pro se litigants may 
have access to help centers, information tables, pro se clinics, “lawyer-
of-the-day” programs, assistance hotlines, informational websites and 
booklets provided by the court, legal aid systems, pro bono attorneys, 
or law school clinics.49  Furthermore, in an effort to aid pro se liti-
gants, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct—and the legal ethics 
rules in many states based on those Rules—were amended in 2002 to 
allow for “limited scope” or “unbundled” representation as an alterna-
tive to costly full representation.50  To the extent that these measures 
 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms . . . and its guar-
antee of a fair hearing in civil cases required the government to provide free counsel 
to indigent civil litigants . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
47 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005) (highlighting foreign 
and international law against the execution of juveniles as inconsistent with U.S. law); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576-77 (2003) (citing with approval cases from the 
European Court of Human Rights that recognized sexual autonomy “as an integral 
part of human freedom in many other countries”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 
n.21 (2002) (citing an amicus brief from the European Union to support the proposi-
tion that “within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes 
committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved”); see also 
Raven Lidman, Civil Gideon:  A Human Right Elsewhere in the World, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE 
REV. 288, 289 (2006) (citing Roper, Lawrence, and Atkins to argue that “a frontal chal-
lenge to Lassiter may be reasonable at this time”). 
48 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
49 See Russell Engler, And Justice For All—Including the Unrepresented Poor:  Revisiting 
the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 1999-2006 (1999) 
(describing the limited-assistance programs provided to pro se litigants by sources in-
side and outside of the courthouse). 
50 See Alicia M. Farley, An Important Piece of the Bundle:  How Limited Appearances Can 
Provide an Ethically Sound Way to Increase Access to Justice for Pro Se Litigants, 20 GEO. J. LE-
GAL ETHICS 563, 567-68 (2007) (explaining the changes in legal ethics rules allowing 
for limited-scope representation and arguing that these new rules enhance the repre-
sentation of the indigent community).  But cf. Robert Bickel, Limited Legal Services:  Is It 
Worth It?, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 331, 331 (2006) (“[T]he provision of limited 
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in fact diminish the risk of erroneous deprivations, federal courts may 
find that, where such measures are available, court decisions not to 
provide indigent civil litigants with counsel more easily satisfy the Ma-
thews balancing test.51  At the very least, federal courts may be reluctant 
to issue a broad right-to-counsel ruling that would stifle state experi-
mentation before evaluating the effectiveness of such a measure. 
2.  Federal Equal Protection Claims 
Another federal litigation option available to the Civil Gideon 
movement is to mount an equal protection end run around Lassiter.  
Traditionally, the Equal Protection Clause operates by subjecting a law 
to heightened scrutiny when it discriminates between members of a 
suspect class.52  If a suspect class is not involved, the law is given a virtual 
green light under rational basis review, compared to the virtual red 
light a law would receive should a court subject it to strict scrutiny.53  
The traditional approach, however, is not a promising avenue by 
which to achieve a Civil Gideon because the Supreme Court does not 
recognize wealth as a suspect classification, and therefore courts re-
quire that classification to be only rationally related to a legitimate go-
vernmental purpose.54 
The Court’s denial of suspect classifcation status to wealth, however, 
does not completely foreclose an equal protection litigation strategy.  
The “fundamental interest branch of equal protection law”55 provides 
a much more promising avenue for achieving a Civil Gideon because it 
 
legal services to [the indigent] community is not only inefficient, but fails to achieve its 
own goal of providing real help to more clients.”). 
51 Focusing on the second Mathews factor, Michael Millemann argues that, to the 
extent that limited-scope representation reduces the costs of providing representation, 
it would “thereby reduce the State’s disinterest in providing counsel.  In the Mathews 
balance of interests, this could help to tip the balance in favor of a right to counsel.”  
Millemann, supra note 34, at 738.  But because the Lassiter Court characterized states’ 
fiscal interests in avoiding the costs associated with providing counsel as “relatively 
weak” to begin with, limited-scope representation would likely have a larger negative 
impact under the third Mathews factor—risk of erroneous deprivation—than it would 
have a positive effect under the second factor.  See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 
U.S. 18, 31 (1981) (“[T]he State . . . has a relatively weak pecuniary interest . . . .”). 
52 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 669-70. 
53 See id. at 671-72. 
54 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973) (“[T]his 
Court has never heretofore held that wealth discrimination alone provides an ade-
quate basis for invoking strict scrutiny . . . .”). 
55 Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1375, 1413 (2010). 
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focuses on equal access to opportunities provided by the govern-
ment.56  Although “undertheorized and poorly understood,” this 
prong of equal protection jurisprudence applies a “presumption of 
unconstitutionality . . . where a liberty concern meets an equality con-
cern, even if neither the interference nor the inequality standing 
alone would be enough to create such a presumption.”57 
Notably, equal-access-to-justice victories have already been achieved 
under the fundamental interest prong.  In M.L.B. v. S.L.J., the Court 
held that a state requiring litigants to procure a trial transcript as a 
prerequisite to appeal must provide trial transcripts to indigent par-
ents when they appeal adverse judgments in parental rights termina-
tions.58  The Court recognized that in access-to-justice cases like 
M.L.B., “[d]ue process and equal protection principles converge.”59  A 
state need not provide indigent parents the opportunity to appeal be-
cause there is no due process right to a civil appeal.  However, a state 
providing for appeals must ensure equal access to the appellate 
process, regardless of ability to pay, where the “character and intensity 
of the individual interest at stake” are strong, as in parental rights 
terminations.60  Applying the logic of the M.L.B. decision in the Civil 
Gideon context, it could be argued that because the government allows 
individuals to have counsel in civil cases, and especially because the 
state affirmatively grants a monopoly to lawyers in providing legal ser-
vices, the state must make reasonable efforts to ensure that access to 
 
56 See id. at 1413-14 (discussing the notion that certain government programs, if 
established, must be “equally available” to all). 
57 Id. at 1413; see also Nelson Tebbe, Deborah Widiss & Shannon Gilreath, Debate, 
The Argument for Same-Sex Marriage, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 21, 25 (2010), 
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/Marriage.pdf (Tebbe & Widiss, Opening 
Statement) (“Equal access . . . recognizes a harm may exist even if the relevant conduct 
is not protected by due process and even if the exclusion is not based on a suspect clas-
sification.”).  Tebbe and Widiss use voting rights cases as an example of a fundamental 
interest argument.  Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 55, at 1417-19.  Even though the “Con-
stitution is not commonly thought to guarantee a right to vote in presidential or state 
elections,” and wealth classifications do not usually trigger strict scrutiny, the Court 
invalidated poll taxes as unconstitutional because restrictions on voting implicate a 
fundamental interest.  See id. at 1417-19 (citing Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 
663, 667-68 (1966)).   
58 See 519 U.S. 102, 128 (1996) (“[W]e hold that Mississippi may not withhold 
from M. L. B. ‘a record of sufficient completeness to permit proper [appellate] con-
sideration of [her] claims.’” (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 198 (1971))). 
59 Id. at 120 (alteration in original) (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 
665 (1983)). 
60 Id. 
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the services of this professional monopoly is available on an equal ba-
sis, at least where an individual’s fundamental rights or fundamental 
interests are at stake in the litigation.61 
Although the equal access argument appears to be the most prom-
ising federal litigation strategy for achieving a Civil Gideon, the  
Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in a case that squarely  
addressed the issue.62  Rhine v. Deaton involved a Texas parental rights 
termination suit brought against an infant’s biological mother by his 
temporary foster parents, distinguishing it from the state-initiated  
parental rights termination in Lassiter.63  Texas gives parents a statutory 
right to appointed counsel in which the state initiates a parental rights 
termination.64  At issue in the case was whether Texas violated the 
Equal Protection Clause by granting indigent parents appointed 
counsel in state-initiated proceedings while denying the same right to 
indigent parents in private termination suits.65  Access to appellate 
courts was also at issue in the case because the mother was unable to 
pay $405 for the trial transcript, and therefore the appellate court 
could not review most of the issues she raised.66  Even though the state 
 
61 One commentator argues that equal protection claims may serve as a basis for 
achieving a Civil Gideon by first establishing a right to appointed counsel in civil ap-
peals, a “Civil Douglas” (named after Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963), 
which recognized a right to counsel on the first appeal from a criminal conviction).  
See Schwinn, supra note 28, at 604 (“Just as Douglas foreshadowed the categorical right 
to counsel at trial in Gideon forty-three years ago, Civil Douglas would certainly fore-
shadow the categorical civil right to counsel, Civil Gideon.” (footnote omitted)).  
Schwinn concludes that the equal protection analysis used in the line of decisions  
culminating in M.L.B. is a promising avenue for establishing a Civil Douglas, and ulti-
mately a Civil Gideon, because the inquiry focuses on the “priority of equality in 
process.”  Id. at 609.  This focus is in contrast to emphasizing the “underlying interests 
at issue,” which is the focus of the Lassiter presumption currently inhibiting a due 
process route to Civil Gideon.  Id. 
62 See Rhine v. Deaton, 130 S. Ct. 1281, 1281 (2010) (mem.) (denying writ of certi-
orari). 
63 See Mary Alice Robbins, Cert Sought over Right to Counsel in Parental-Rights Termina-
tion Case, TEX. LAW., July 13, 2009, at 5, 5 (describing the history of the privately in-
itiated termination suit in which certiorari was sought).   
64 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013 (West Supp. 2009) (discussing the require-
ments for the appointment of an attorney ad litem in suits involving termination of the 
parent-child relationship). 
65 See Robbins, supra note 63, at 5 (stating that the Court had the option to ap-
point counsel in private suits, but was not required to as it was under section 107.013 in 
state-initiated proceedings).  
66 In re Interest of J.C., 250 S.W.3d 486, 489 (Tex. App. 2008) (“We cannot review 
Tracy’s first three issues in the absence of a reporter’s record.”).  Although the court 
recognized an indigent litigant’s right to a transcript, as the Supreme Court held in 
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appellate court lacked a trial record from which to weigh the Mathews 
factors under Lassiter, it denied her claim to appointed counsel.67  In a 
rare move, the Court invited the Texas Solicitor General to file a brief 
on behalf of the state addressing whether the Court should take up 
the case; Texas’s brief recommended that the Court deny certiorari.68  
If Texas’s brief in Rhine is an indication of state government opposition 
to a broad-based ruling in favor of the right to counsel on equal pro-
tection grounds, then it is possible that an equal protection litigation 
strategy may hurt the Civil Gideon cause.  If states cannot distinguish 
between litigants when deciding who will receive a statutory right to 
appointed counsel, state legislatures may respond to an equal protec-
tion ruling by repealing existing statutory rights or reconsidering the 
expansion of the right to counsel in other contexts.69 
3.  State Constitutional Claims 
The barriers to a federal litigation strategy suggest that litigation 
of right-to-counsel issues may fare better in state courts than federal 
courts because state courts are free to interpret state constitutions to 
provide greater protection than the federal Constitution.  In Lassiter, 
the Court recognized that states might reach different conclusions on 
the propriety of providing attorneys to indigent defendants in civil 
cases.70  State appellate court decisions have produced some limited 
success in expanding the right to counsel in parental rights termina-
tion cases.  Some state courts reject Lassiter on state procedural due 
process grounds and extend the right to appointed counsel to private 
 
M.L.B., the issue was not raised on appeal.  See id. at 488 n.3 (noting that the mother 
did not appeal the trial court’s order requiring her to pay for the reporter’s record). 
67 See id. at 489 (“Because Tracy’s parental rights were terminated pursuant to a 
private termination suit, she possessed no mandatory statutory right to appointed 
counsel . . . .”). 
68 See Brief for the State of Texas as Amicus Curiae at 5, Rhine v. Deaton, 130 S. Ct. 
1281 (2010) (No. 08-1596) (explaining that there is no justification for creating an ex-
ception to allow the petition to raise federal claims that were not decided in state 
court, and that the claims are insubstantial). 
69 See Schwinn, supra note 28, at 608 n.37 (“If states are concerned about the dis-
parity in statutory right-to-counsel under different statutory schemes of the same gen-
eral type (e.g., schemes terminating parental rights), they may simply revoke the statu-
tory right to counsel in all statutory schemes of that type to avoid the disparate 
treatment and equal protection problems.”). 
70 See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 34 (1981) (“The Court’s opinion 
today in no way implies that the standards increasingly urged by informed public opi-
nion and now widely followed by the States are other than enlightened and wise.”). 
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termination proceedings.71  Several state courts have reached the same 
result on state equal protection grounds.72  Based on these successes, 
one optimistic commentator concluded that “it should be reasonably 
possible to substantially expand the right to counsel in civil cases 
through litigation in state courts based on the due process provisions 
of state constitutions.”73 
Beyond parental rights termination proceedings, however, state 
appellate courts have been reluctant to recognize a right to appointed 
counsel on constitutional grounds.  In a recent case before the Alaska 
Supreme Court—for which the ABA submitted an amicus brief74—the 
court refused to take up the issue of whether an indigent mother was 
entitled to an attorney in a custody proceeding in which the other 
party was represented by a private attorney.75  Despite prior progressive 
court opinions expanding the right to counsel in custody proceedings 
where the opposing party was represented by a public agency,76 the 
Alaska Supreme Court dismissed the case after focusing on unrelated 
mootness grounds.77  In contrast, the Washington Supreme Court  
addressed the right-to-counsel issue head on, holding that due process 
did not require the trial court to appoint counsel to a wife in a divorce 
proceeding in which the lower court granted primary residential care 
of the child to the husband.78  Prior to that decision, a Washington  
 
71 See Millemann, supra note 34, at 748-56 (recounting right-to-counsel decisions 
based upon state constitutional grounds in Alaska, California, Florida, and Kansas); 
Schwinn, supra note 28, at 607 n.35 (noting state appellate decisions recognizing a 
right to counsel in private terminations in Alaska, California, Maine, and Montana). 
72 See Millemann, supra note 34, at 736 n.21 (listing several state court decisions 
finding a right to counsel based on equal protection in adoption cases, including cases 
from Illinois, Iowa, North Dakota, and Oregon). 
73 Id. at 765. 
74 See Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appel-
lee Siv Jonsson at 1, Office of Pub. Advocacy v. Alaska Court Sys., No. S-12999 (Alaska 
Nov. 19, 2008), 2008 WL 5585565, at *1 (stating the ABA’s support for the appoint-
ment of counsel in civil cases, such as child custody cases, where basic human needs 
are at stake).    
75 See Alaska Supreme Court Declines to Rule on Right to Counsel, CIV. RIGHT TO COUNS. 
UPDATE (Nat’l Coal. for a Civil Right to Counsel, Baltimore, Md.), Oct. 2009, available at 
http://www.civilrighttocounsel.org/pdfs/2009%20October%20Civil%20Right%20to% 
20Counsel%20Update.pdf. 
76 See Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893, 895, 896 n.12 (Alaska 1979) (holding that due 
process required courts to appoint counsel in “cases involving child custody where an 
indigent party’s opponent is represented by counsel provided by a public agency”). 
77 See Alaska Supreme Court Declines to Rule on Right to Counsel, supra note 75. 
78 See King v. King, 174 P.3d 659, 661-63 (Wash. 2007) (“The interest at stake here 
is not commensurate with the fundamental parental liberty interest at stake in a termi-
nation or dependency proceeding.”). 
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appellate court “reversed orders modifying a parenting plan and hold-
ing the pro se mother in contempt, but declined to order appointment 
of counsel in the custody modification proceedings.”79  Similarly, the 
high courts in Maryland and Wisconsin declined to address right-to-
counsel issues in custody cases.80  Although the Washington Supreme 
Court decision is the only decision discussed above that squarely denied 
a right-to-counsel claim on state constitutional grounds, the tendency of 
other courts to avoid the issue on justiciability grounds suggests a reluc-
tance within state judiciaries to expand the right to appointed counsel. 
B.  Legislative Strategies 
Legislative strategies for achieving a Civil Gideon appear better posi-
tioned than judicial strategies because of the volume of statutes provid-
ing for appointed counsel and the current state and local efforts to  
expand the civil right to counsel—inspired by ABA Resolution 112A.  
When the Court decided Lassiter, thirty-three states and the District of 
Columbia already had statutes requiring counsel in parental rights  
termination cases.81  Laura Abel and Max Rettig’s article compiles a 
thorough list of statutes currently on the books, finding that “[o]ver the 
past few decades, states have passed hundreds of laws . . . guaranteeing 
the right to counsel in a wide variety of civil cases.”82  Of the family law 
matters where Abel and Rettig identify right-to-counsel statutes, the 
most common statutory grants of counsel are for children involved in 
dependency proceedings,83 parents defending against state-initiated  
parental rights termination proceedings, and parents in dependency 
proceedings.84  Although rare, Abel and Rettig also identify states that 
 
79 Russell Engler, Shaping a Context-Based Civil Gideon from the Dynamics of Social 
Change, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 697, 702 (2006) (citing In re Custody of 
Halls, 109 P.3d 15, 17 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005)). 
80 See Frase v. Barnhart, 840 A.2d 114, 115 (Md. 2003) (finding a mother’s right-to-
counsel claim in a custody case moot); Engler, supra note 79, at 702 (citing Kelly v. Cir-
cuit Court, No. 04-2999 (Wis. Apr. 6, 2005) (declining to reach the Civil Gideon issue in 
denying the petition for original jurisdiction of a declaratory judgment action)). 
81 Rosalie R. Young, The Right to Appointed Counsel in Termination of Parental Rights 
Proceedings:  The States’ Response to Lassiter, 14 TOURO L. REV. 247, 256 (1997). 
82 Laura K. Abel & Max Rettig, State Statutes Providing for a Right to Counsel in Civil 
Cases, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 245, 245 (2006). 
83 See id. (“Federal law requires states receiving federal child abuse prevention and 
treatment funding to appoint a representative for children involved in abuse or neg-
lect proceedings.”). 
84 See id. at 246 n.6 (citing ASTRA OUTLEY, PEW COMM’N ON CHILDREN IN FOSTER 
CARE, REPRESENTATION FOR CHILDREN AND PARENTS IN DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS 7 
(2003), available at http://www.pewfostercare.org/research/docs/Representation.pdf) 
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grant a right to counsel in domestic violence proceedings, divorces and 
annulments, private termination proceedings, paternity proceedings, 
proceedings regarding visitation or permanency for children in foster 
care, and child custody, support, and visitation proceedings.85  In addi-
tion to family matters, most states have statutes granting a right to  
appointed counsel in involuntary civil commitment cases, and a few 
states have statutes addressing particular medical treatments, such as 
judicial bypass proceedings for minors seeking abortions.86 
The scope of current efforts drawing inspiration from ABA Reso-
lution 112A is not limited to the three most common categories of 
current state right-to-counsel statutes that Abel and Rettig identify.87  
Favoring an “incremental approach” to expanding the right to  
appointed counsel in cases where “basic human needs are at stake,” 
the ABA defines “basic human needs” cases as involving either shelter 
(e.g., eviction proceedings), sustenance (e.g., “denials of or termina-
tion of government payments or benefits”), safety (e.g., “proceedings 
to obtain or enforce restraining orders”), health (e.g., claims to Medi-
care, Medicaid, or private insurance for “access to appropriate health 
care for treatment of significant health problems”), or child custody.88  
Numerous state and local bar associations are following the ABA’s 
lead, establishing committees and task forces to recommend ways to 
expand the right to counsel in their jurisdictions.89  Notable among 
these efforts is a report issued by the Boston Bar Association Task 
Force on Expanding the Civil Right to Counsel, which recommends 
that the legislature fund pilot programs to establish rights to counsel 
for civil cases that are quasi-criminal (such as immigration and juvenile 
 
(“[S]ix states require that counsel be appointed for indigent parents in all dependency 
proceedings, thirty-nine require that counsel be provided for indigent parents in at 
least some dependency proceedings, three require that counsel be provided for indi-
gent parents in termination-of-parental-rights cases only, and three do not have statues 
‘explicitly’ providing for the appointment of counsel for parents in any dependency or 
termination-of-parental-rights cases.”). 
85 Id. at 246. 
86 See id. at 246-47. 
87 See id. at 245-47 (identifying family law; involuntary commitment, quarantine, or 
removal of legal rights; and medical treatment as the most common categories of state 
right-to-counsel claims). 
88 AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 1, at 12-13. 
89 See Marvy & Abel, supra note 6, at 132-44 (acknowledging eleven states’ efforts to 
expand the civil right to counsel). 
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cases in which litigants risk being deprived of their physical liberty), as 
well as family and housing cases.90 
Funding is the most significant obstacle facing these legislative  
efforts, but it is not an insurmountable challenge.  A recent Texas study 
estimates that legal aid services produce “$457.6 million in spending, 
$219.7 million in output (gross product), and 3,171 jobs,” in addition to 
generating “approximately $30.5 million in yearly fiscal revenues to 
State and local governmental entities, which is well above their approx-
imately $4.8 million in contributions.”91  Civil Gideon legislation efforts 
may have economic and societal benefits because they “(1) reduce the 
need for safety-net programs, rearrests of juvenile offenders, the time 
children spend in foster care, and the incidence of domestic violence; 
(2) improve clients’ health; and (3) bring federal funding into a 
state.”92  Legislators’ awareness of the larger social benefits and cost-
saving potential of Civil Gideon legislation has already positively influ-
enced the debates over the right to counsel in several state legislatures.93 
The most significant piece of legislation passed as a result of these 
efforts is California’s Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act, which finances 
pilot programs proposed by legal aid organizations by increasing court 
fees for prevailing parties by ten dollars.94  The Act directs the pilot pro-
grams to provide counsel to indigent litigants in selected courts “in civil 
matters involving housing-related matters, domestic-violence and civil 
harassment restraining orders, probate conservatorships, guardianships 
of the person, elder abuse, or actions by a parent to obtain sole legal or 
 
90 See BOSTON BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON EXPANDING THE CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL, 
GIDEON’S NEW TRUMPET:  EXPANDING THE CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MASSACHUSETTS 
2 (2008), available at http://www.bostonbar.org/prs/reports/GideonsNewTrumpet.pdf  
(recommending “starting points for an expanded civil right to counsel” in Massachu-
setts). 
91 THE PERRYMAN GROUP, THE IMPACT OF LEGAL AID SERVICES ON ECONOMIC AC-
TIVITY IN TEXAS:  AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT EFFORTS AND EXPANSION POTENTIAL 3 
(2009) (emphasis omitted), available at  http://www.texasatj.org/files/file/Perryman% 
20Report.pdf. 
92 Laura K. Abel & Susan Vignola, Economic and Other Benefits Associated with the Pro-
vision of Civil Legal Aid, 9 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 139, 155 (2011). 
93 See id. at 158 (“Legislators in Arkansas, Montana, and Texas were motivated to 
expand the right to counsel in child welfare cases by evidence that providing parents 
with counsel would reduce the days that children spend in expensive foster care.”); cf. 
William Glaberson, Judge’s Budget Will Seek Big Expansion of Legal Aid to the Poor in Civil 
Cases, N.Y. TIMES (N.Y. ed.), Nov. 29, 2010, at A21 (reporting that a task force created 
by New York’s chief judge “makes a detailed argument that providing more lawyers for 
people with low incomes would be cost-efficient for the state”). 
94 See Carol J. Williams, State Gives Poor a New Legal Right, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2009, 
at 8, available at 2009 WLNR 20533552. 
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physical custody of a child.”95  The Act also directs the judiciary to con-
duct studies to determine the effectiveness of the pilot programs, the 
results of which are sure to “be closely watched by access-to-justice advo-
cates across the country.”96  If California’s progress is any indication of 
the Civil Gideon movement’s trajectory, the most likely avenue for  
expanding the right to counsel is through legislative strategies. 
II.  EVALUATING THE GOAL IN LIGHT OF GIDEON’S FLAWS 
Although the right to appointed counsel is likely to expand as the 
Civil Gideon movement’s legislative strategy gains momentum, the  
lessons learned from nearly five decades of experimentation in indigent 
criminal defense leaves some open questions:  What is the nature of the 
right the Civil Gideon movement intends to give indigent civil litigants?  
What should be the remedy when that right is violated?  In the criminal 
context, courts afford indigent defendants who are appointed attorneys 
a claim of ineffective assistance as recourse when they have been  
deprived of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  An examination 
of current statutory rights in the civil context reveals that many courts in 
parental rights termination cases adopt essentially the same standard 
for effectiveness of counsel used in criminal cases, “often without analy-
sis of its applicability in a non-criminal context.”97  This Part analyzes the 
standard the Supreme Court developed in the criminal context and 
concludes that its leniency in finding effective assistance of counsel may 
frustrate the benefits the Civil Gideon movement seeks. 
Even before Gideon, the Supreme Court recognized that where a 
criminal defendant was entitled to appointed counsel, he also had a 
right to effective assistance of counsel.98  In the trial of nine young black 
men charged with the rape of two young white women while traveling 
on a freight train through Alabama, the trial court attempted to ap-
point the defendants’ counsel by “appoint[ing] the whole bar of 
Scottsboro (six men) to represent them.  Only one attorney agreed to 
do so, and he did so only on the morning of trial.”99  The defendants, 
who had previously escaped a lynch mob when first arrested, were sen-
 
95 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68651(b)(1) (West Supp. 2010). 
96 Williams, supra note 94. 
97 Calkins, supra note 20, at 212. 
98 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 56, 71 (1932). 
99 Cole, supra note 12, at 106. 
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tenced to death.100  Emphasizing the “especially strong facts pre-
sented,”101 the Supreme Court held not only that the defendants were 
entitled to appointed counsel under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment but that they had been deprived of this right—
despite the trial court’s attempt to appoint counsel—because the  
“designation of counsel as was attempted was either so indefinite or so 
close upon the trial as to amount to a denial of effective and substantial 
aid.”102  Post-Gideon, the Court echoed the concern about effectiveness 
of counsel in a line of cases addressing government interference with 
the ability of lawyers to mount effective defenses.103  Not until 1984 did 
the Court address the standard for “actual ineffectiveness,” noting that 
it occurs when counsel “[deprives] a defendant of the right to effective 
assistance, simply by failing to render ‘adequate legal assistance.’”104 
When the Court finally took up the issue, the facts of the case, like 
the unsympathetic facts in Lassiter, made Strickland v. Washington 
“probably the worst possible case to set forth the parameters for  
effective assistance of counsel.”105  Professor David Cole describes the  
disturbing history behind the case that would unfortunately establish 
the limits upon the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel in 
criminal cases: 
On a two-week crime spree in September 1976, David Leroy Washington 
robbed and killed a minister because he was a homosexual; robbed and 
killed a woman in her home while her three elderly sisters-in-law watch-
ed while bound and gagged, and then shot all three of the sisters-in-law 
in the head; and kidnapped a man, stabbed him repeatedly, and even-
tually killed him.
106
 
Prior to defining a constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel 
standard, the Court noted that Washington appeared to be the source 
of many of his appointed attorney’s difficulties at the trial level—
 
100 See id. (“The defendants, taken off the train at Scottsboro, narrowly escaped a 
lynch mob, but were then promptly sentenced to death within a matter of days, as 
thousands stood outside the courthouse door and cheered.”). 
101 Id. 
102 Powell, 287 U.S. at 53. 
103 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (“Government violates 
the right to effective assistance when it interferes in certain ways with the ability of 
counsel to make independent decisions about how to conduct the defense.”). 
104 Id. (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980)). 
105 Cole, supra note 12, at 108; see also George C. Thomas III, History’s Lesson for the 
Right to Counsel, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 543, 549 (describing Strickland as “The Case from 
Hell”). 
106 Cole, supra note 12, at 108. 
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leading the attorney to experience a “sense of hopelessness about the 
case.”107  As a result of this “hopelessness,” the attorney did not make 
much of an effort in preparing evidence of mitigating circumstances 
for the sentencing phase of trial, at which Washington was sentenced 
to death.108  On appeal of his death sentence, however, Washington 
challenged the appointed trial counsel’s effectiveness, alleging several 
specific claims concerning his attorney’s preparation and perfor-
mance at the sentencing phase of trial.109 
Addressing these issues, the Supreme Court established a two-prong 
test for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel appeals, with the 
burden of proof for both elements resting on the defendant.110  First, 
the defendant must demonstrate “that counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the de-
fendant by the Sixth Amendment.”111  The standard for measuring this 
“performance” prong is “reasonableness under prevailing professional 
norms.”112  But the Court did not stop there; it also established a “strong 
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of rea-
sonable professional assistance.”113  Second, the Court established a 
“prejudice” prong, requiring the defendant to show “that there is a rea-
sonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the re-
sult of the proceeding would have been different.”114  The Court ac-
knowledged that the Strickland test is “highly deferential” in order to 
 
107 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 672.  The Court noted that, despite his counsel’s advice, 
Washington confessed to the murders, waived his right to a jury trial, and pleaded 
guilty to all charges.  Id. 
108 See Cole, supra note 12, at 109-10 (characterizing Washington’s defense attor-
ney’s explanations for failing to conduct presentencing investigation as “inconsistent”). 
109 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 675 (“[Washington] asserted that counsel was ineffec-
tive because he failed to move for a continuance to prepare for sentencing, to request a 
psychiatric report, to investigate and present character witnesses, to seek a presentence 
investigation report, to present meaningful arguments to the sentencing judge, and to 
investigate the medical examiner’s reports or cross-examine the medical experts.”). 
110 See id. at 687 (“Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that 
the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process 
that renders the result unreliable.”). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 688.  The Court declined to adopt more specific performance guidelines, 
such as the ABA Criminal Justice Standards.  See id. at 688-89 (stating that these are only 
“guides” for a reasonableness determination).  Justice O’Connor, writing for the ma-
jority, concluded that such guidelines may be informative but would hamper the inde-
pendent professional judgment of counsel and “distract counsel from the overriding 
mission of vigorous advocacy of the defendant’s cause” if incorporated as standards for 
measuring effectiveness of counsel.  Id. at 689. 
113 Id. at 689. 
114 Id. at 694. 
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prevent postconviction second-guessing in the interest of finality.115  
With respect to the facts in Strickland, the Court held that the attorney’s 
conduct was within the “range of professionally reasonable judgments,” 
and even if counsel had more effectively presented mitigating factors, 
the resulting sentence would have remained the same because of the 
overwhelming aggravating factors against Washington.116 
Scholarly criticism of the Strickland standard has been scathing.117  
Foremost among Strickland’s critics, Professor Richard Klein notes that 
courts do not attach a similar “strong presumption” in favor of rea-
sonable performance when reviewing the conduct of other profes-
sionals, such as physicians, surgeons, accountants, and architects.118  
Furthermore, the presumption makes little sense “[i]n light of the 
widespread acknowledgment of the existence of a crisis in the quality 
of representation provided to indigent defendants.”119  With respect to 
the “prejudice” prong, Strickland also invites courts to engage in his-
torical revisionist speculation, yet Professor Klein complains that it is 
often difficult to speculate as to the effect a competent attorney may 
have had on a case’s outcome.120  The difficulty is compounded when 
the record on appeal does “not reveal weaknesses in the prosecutor’s 
case because of counsel’s incompetence.”121  In other words, an attor-
ney’s incompetence may be the reason there is insufficient evidence 
on the record for an appellate court to spot incompetence in the first 
place.  Thus, Strickland establishes a Catch-22 for those who need the 
right to effective counsel the most:  by considering the weight of the 
evidence against a defendant, the “prejudice” prong either allows 
courts to ignore an attorney’s egregious errors or prevents them from 
 
115 See id. at 689-90 (“The availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney 
performance or of detailed guidelines for its evaluation would encourage the prolifera-
tion of ineffectiveness challenges.”). 
116 See id. at 699-700 (deciding against the defendant on both prongs). 
117 See Thomas, supra note 105, at 547 (“Scholars have concluded that the Strick-
land approach is a cynical dead end, designed to affirm all but the most deeply flawed 
convictions.”). 
118 See Klein, supra note 10, at 640-41 (comparing the Strickland standard to ones 
used for other types of expert testimony). 
119 Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. 
L. REV. 1433, 1452 (1999). 
120 See Klein, supra note 10, at 641 (“The absence of effective representation may 
well have had an effect on the entire proceeding that was so pervasive that it is not 
possible to accurately determine the degree of prejudice.”). 
121 Klein, supra note 119, at 1467. 
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realizing that such errors occurred.122  Finally, although the Strickland 
Court was motivated by concerns of finality and efficiency, it has 
“created the worst of all possible outcomes”:  the standard “has proved 
virtually impossible to meet” but “[b]ecause the standard is fairly open-
ended . . . it does little to forestall the filing of ineffectiveness claims.”123 
Not only does the Strickland standard create individual injustices 
for many defendants by effectively vitiating their Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel, but it also contributes to the main systemic failure of 
the Gideon mandate:  inadequate funding for indigent defense.124  Due 
in large part to Strickland’s low bar for attorney competence, only 6 of 
103 ineffectiveness claims succeeded in the California Supreme Court 
from January 1, 1989, to April 21, 1996, and the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld only 6 of 158 during the same time 
period.125  By “uncritically [accepting] the status quo as ‘effective,’ 
[Strickland] creates no incentive for states to improve on existing stan-
dards of legal representation for the poor.”126  If the bar for effective 
counsel were set higher, and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
consequently were upheld with greater frequency, states might respond 
by improving indigent defense to avoid the cost of reprosecuting cases. 
The Strickland standard also effectively precludes litigation chal-
lenging counsel competence based on objective factors surrounding 
the representation.  In a companion case to Strickland, United States v. 
Cronic, the Court held that “only when surrounding circumstances jus-
tify a presumption of ineffectiveness can a Sixth Amendment claim be 
sufficient without inquiry into counsel’s actual performance.”127  The 
facts at hand, extrinsic to the appointed counsel’s actual perfor-
mance—such as his youth, inexperience with jury trials or with the 
subject matter at hand, and that the government had prepared the 
 
122 See Klein, supra note 10, at 645 (“When there have been the most egregious fail-
ings by counsel is exactly when the record may indeed be barren of any indication of 
reasonable doubt.  Yet, it is those very situations where courts now need not even pro-
ceed to attempt to discover the failings of counsel.”). 
123 Cole, supra note 12, at 114. 
124 For criticisms of state indigent defense funding, see STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL 
AID & INDIGENT DEF., supra note 11, at 7-9, which examines testimony about under-
funded indigent defense services throughout the country.  See also Stephen B. Bright, Nei-
ther Equal Nor Just:  The Rationing and Denial of Legal Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty 
Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 816-21 (“The most fundamental reason for the 
poor quality or absence of legal services for the poor in the criminal justice system is the 
refusal of governments to allocate sufficient funds for indigent defense programs.”). 
125 Cole, supra note 12, at 117. 
126 Id. at 114. 
127 466 U.S. 648, 662 (1984). 
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case for four-and-a-half years while the attorney was appointed twenty-
five days before trial—bore on the adequacy of his representation but 
were not “circumstances that in themselves make it unlikely that res-
pondent received the effective assistance of counsel.”128  Cronic “made 
any systemic challenges to the adequacy of counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment based on the inadequacy of funding and resources vir-
tually impossible, and effectively required case-by-case adjudication of 
Sixth Amendment claims.”129 
III.  FOUNDATIONS FOR CIVIL INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL CLAIMS 
In light of the negative effects Strickland has had on the right to 
appointed counsel for criminal defendants, the Civil Gideon movement 
should consider how failures in the process will be remedied to ensure 
that Civil Gideon will not become a hollow right.  Before identifying al-
ternative standards for ineffectiveness of counsel, however, this Part 
explores the grounds for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
against appointed counsel in civil cases. 
Unlike the ineffectiveness claim brought in Strickland, claims in 
the civil context will not be grounded in the Sixth Amendment.  Un-
der normal circumstances, where civil counsel is not appointed, a 
malpractice suit is the only remedy available to a civil litigant who be-
lieves that a lawyer’s negligence resulted in an adverse judgment.130  
Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)—and its analogs in 
state procedural rules—provide relief from judgment for “mistake, in-
advertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,”131 these rules generally 
apply only to cases in which defendants seek relief from default judg-
ments.132  A civil attorney’s gross negligence is usually imputed to the 
client based on agency law principles.133  Imputing the attorney’s inef-
 
128 Id. at 648, 665-66. 
129 Cole, supra note 12, at 116. 
130 See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 634 n.10 (1962) (“[I]f an attorney’s 
conduct falls substantially below what is reasonable under the circumstances, the 
client’s remedy is against the attorney in a suit for malpractice.”). 
131 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1).  
132 See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 612 (4th ed. 2005) (“In 
practice . . . the rule most frequently is invoked successfully in the default setting or 
when the plaintiff’s suit was dismissed for failure to prosecute and judgment was en-
tered by mistake since the party fully intended actively to litigate the dispute.” (foot-
notes omitted)). 
133 See Link, 370 U.S. at 634 (“[E]ach party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-
agent and is considered to have ‘notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged 
upon the attorney.’” (quoting Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320, 326 (1879))). 
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fective representation to the client, however, does not seem appropri-
ate when an indigent litigant did not freely select her attorney but ra-
ther was appointed one by the court. 
If a Civil Gideon is achieved through litigation, at either the state 
or federal level, the right to effective assistance of counsel will likely 
follow from the Supreme Court’s current right-to-counsel jurispru-
dence.  The Court has long recognized “that the right to counsel is the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel.”134  Currently, when the case-
by-case balance of the Mathews factors under Lassiter compels a court to 
appoint counsel, “presumably there is a federal constitutional right to 
effective assistance of counsel.”135  Therefore, if courts granted the  
expansion in the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, 
they will likely acknowledge the corollary right to effective counsel. 
Achieving recognition of a right to effective assistance of counsel 
may be more difficult if Civil Gideon rights are formed through legisla-
tion.  The argument could be made that because the statutory rights 
are not grounded in the Constitution—as they would be if judicially 
created—there is no right to effective assistance of counsel.  The  
Supreme Court has denied the right to effective assistance of counsel 
in discretionary criminal appeals when there is no Sixth Amendment 
right to appointed counsel, even when the lower court used its discre-
tion to appoint counsel.136  Similarly, “a series of inconsistent California 
appellate court decisions” in the 1980s and 1990s sometimes declined 
to recognize a parent’s right to effective assistance of counsel where 
counsel was appointed pursuant to statute.137  The California legislature 
 
134 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). 
135 Calkins, supra note 20, at 196; see also Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 
153, 254-56 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that when mothers in dependency hearings are 
entitled to counsel according to Lassiter’s application of the Mathews factors, ineffective 
assistance of counsel violates their constitutional rights).   
136 See Calkins, supra note 20, at 196 n.87 (“Because there is no constitutional right 
to counsel for a discretionary appeal, there is no right to effective assistance of counsel 
to prosecute a discretionary appeal.” (citation omitted) (citing Wainwright v. Torna, 455 
U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982), and Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974))).  Likewise, until 
Attorney General Holder vacated the decision, former Attorney General Mukasey’s de-
cision in In re Compean held that “[b]ecause the Constitution does not confer a right to 
counsel . . . in [alien] removal proceedings, . . . there is no constitutional right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel in such proceedings.”  24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 726 (A.G. 2009), 
vacated, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (A.G. 2009). 
137 See Patton, supra note 20, at 229-31 (“Although the California courts appear to 
have determined that there is no right to effective assistance of counsel for statutorily 
appointed attorneys, the legislature has recently provided that right:  ‘All parties who 
are represented by counsel at dependency proceedings shall be entitled to competent 
counsel.’” (quoting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317.5(a) (West 2008))). 
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eventually amended the statute to require competent counsel.138  Not-
ably, in In re Arturo A., the court concluded that “it is reasonably well 
established that reversal based on ineffective assistance of counsel is not 
available when the right to counsel was only statutory.”139  The In re Ar-
turo A. court, however, appears to be an exception among state courts 
when it comes to recognizing a right to effective assistance of counsel 
when a statute mandates appointed counsel.140  The majority position 
recognizes that a “statutory right is meaningless unless it is the effective 
assistance of counsel to which the [party] is entitled.”141 
Apart from statutory interpretation, there are due process grounds 
for recognizing ineffectiveness claims when counsel is appointed by 
statute.  In Nicholson v. Williams, a class action upholding a preliminary 
injunction against a city child-services administration for its conduct in 
dependency cases, the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York concluded that New York violated the Due Process 
Clause by providing mothers ineffective counsel in supposed com-
pliance with a state statutory right to counsel.142  The court reasoned 
that when New York “undertake[s] the role of good samaritan in pro-
viding counsel to the needy, inducing their reliance and preventing 
others from assisting, the State and City must carry out the role they 
have assumed with propriety.”143  The court found that the provision of 
counsel for abused mothers was “largely a sham” because it 
cruelly supplies attorneys who can not, and do not, properly represent 
[them].  They do not investigate.  They do not consult with their client.  
They are not available for consultation.  Their very existence delays hear-
ings and proper prompt resolution of cases in Family Court, resulting in 
unnecessary separation of mothers and children and in unnecessarily 
prolonging those separations.  The result is a practice and policy by the 
State and City of New York violating the substantive and procedural con-
stitutional rights of many abused mothers and their children.
144
 
 
138 Id. 
139 San Diego Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Veronica A. (In re Arturo A.), 10 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 131, 135 (Ct. App. 1992). 
140 See Calkins, supra note 20, at 197 n.91 (listing state cases that recognize ineffec-
tiveness claims for counsel appointed in accordance with state statutory provisions). 
141 Id. at 197. 
142 See 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 165, 256-57 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Offering counsel to a 
mother accused of neglect, and then hamstringing that counsel in such a way that the 
mother is likely to receive inadequate representation impairs the litigant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to effective counsel.”). 
143 Id. at 257. 
144 Id. at 253-54. 
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If the Civil Gideon movement wishes to avoid demoralizing expe-
riences with statutory expansions of the right to appointed counsel 
like that discussed in Nicholson, it must establish grounds for litigants 
to challenge the effectiveness of counsel.  Given California’s expe-
rience, it is best if the legislation granting a statutory right to counsel 
also provides that such counsel must be effective.145 
IV.  ALTERNATIVES TO STRICKLAND FOR A CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Unfortunately, most jurisdictions that provide appointed counsel 
in parental terminations either expressly adopt Strickland or impliedly 
follow it, with the predictable result that these “courts decline to find 
ineffectiveness.”146  As the Civil Gideon movement begins achieving re-
sults, however, courts should reevaluate the propriety of applying a 
standard that is based on the Sixth Amendment and is intended for 
the criminal context.  Procedural safeguards unique to the criminal 
context, and the criticism Strickland has received even in that context, 
make applying the Strickland standard inappropriate in the civil set-
ting.147  Chief among the criminal procedural safeguards absent in the 
civil setting is the high standard of proof—proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, rather than by preponderance of the evidence.  Additionally, 
in parental rights terminations, “[w]ith few exceptions . . . the parents 
are not judged by a jury; and there are often significant exceptions to 
the application of the rules of evidence.”148  After articulating the 
principles and policy goals for a standard by which to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of counsel, this Part evaluates several possible alternatives 
to the Strickland standard that may be better suited to the civil context. 
A.  Principles and Policy Goals 
Two principal goals and two secondary goals inform the standard 
for ineffectiveness of counsel.  The central question in Strickland is 
whether an indigent litigant’s appointed lawyer will effectively subject 
 
145 For a discussion of another state that codifies effective assistance of counsel in 
its statutory grant of appointed counsel, see Calkins, supra note 20, at 198 n.97.  “Min-
nesota’s statute provides for effective assistance of counsel in termination proceed-
ings.”  Id.  “The child, parent, guardian or custodian has the right to effective assis-
tance of counsel in connection with a proceeding in juvenile court.” Id. (citing MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 260C.163(3)(a) (West 2003)). 
146 Calkins, supra note 20, at 214-15. 
147 See id. at 229 (“Termination proceedings, while formal, do not have all of the 
procedural safeguards of criminal proceedings.”). 
148 Id. 
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the opposition’s case or defense to the type of adversarial testing “that 
our system counts on to produce just results.”149  Put another way, the 
Strickland Court’s main concern was the accuracy of outcomes.  Inde-
pendent of “just results,” however, is also the value of ensuring that out-
comes “are obtained only through fundamentally fair procedures.”150 
In his article, Professor Klein notes that the Presidential Commis-
sion on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice recognized 
that “[f]air treatment of every individual—fair in fact and also perceived 
to be fair by those affected—is an essential element of justice and a prin-
cipal objective of the American criminal justice system.”151  Indeed, Pro-
fessor Tom Tyler’s research on procedural justice supports this proposi-
tion by demonstrating that “people care about the decision-making 
process.  They consider evidence about representation, neutrality, bias, 
honesty, quality of decision, and consistency.  People’s concerns about 
decision making are not simply instrumental.”152  If ineffective assistance 
of counsel “becomes one of the many indignities visited upon some-
one” who comes in contact with the civil justice system,153 it may under-
mine the legitimacy of the judicial process, discouraging compliance 
with court orders and encouraging people to resort to self-help.154 
In addition to the principal goal of achieving justice, Susan Calkins, 
a former associate justice of the Maine Supreme Court, identifies two 
related “secondary goals” in Strickland:  preventing “‘proliferation of in-
effectiveness challenges’”155 and “efficiently processing claims.”156  These 
secondary goals are grounded in the judiciary’s interest in finality, 
which the Strickland Court characterized as “profound.”157  Ironically, as 
Professor Cole suggests, Strickland in practice partially undermines this 
finality by articulating a “fairly open-ended” standard that is difficult 
 
149 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984). 
150 Id. at 711 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
151 Klein, supra note 10, at 642 (alteration in original) (quoting PRESIDENT’S 
COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A 
FREE SOCIETY, at viii (1967)). 
152 TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 175 (1990). 
153 Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 764 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
154 See TYLER, supra note 152, at 172 (“If people have an experience not characte-
rized by fair procedures, their later compliance with the law will be based less strongly 
on the legitimacy of legal authorities.”). 
155 See Calkins, supra note 20, at 230 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 690 (1984)). 
156 Id. 
157 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94. 
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to meet, yet vague enough that it fails to discourage criminal defen-
dants from claiming ineffectiveness of counsel on appeal.158 
B.  The Fundamental-Fairness Approach 
In her article on appellate standards for ineffectiveness claims in 
parental rights termination cases, Associate Justice Calkins explores an 
alternative to Strickland that Oregon courts developed and several other 
states adopted either explicitly or implicitly.159  Although this test ap-
pears to be stricter than Strickland, it is probably not a viable alternative 
for broad application in the civil context because it raises the bar on ef-
fectiveness through an even more amorphous standard than Strickland,  
similarly threatening legitimate interests in the finality of judgments. 
As Associate Justice Calkins explains, in State ex rel. Juvenile Depart-
ment of Multnomah County v. Geist, the Oregon Supreme Court adopted 
“‘a standard which seeks to determine whether a termination proceed-
ing was “fundamentally fair,”’ and referred to the Strickland standard 
as ‘more stringent.’”160  In contrast to the Strickland Court’s focus on 
outcomes, the Oregon Supreme Court appears to have recognized the 
legitimate interest in procedural justice when it stated “that the essence 
of fundamental fairness is the right to be heard at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner.”161  With respect to attorney performance, 
the court stated that “[a]lthough no client has a constitutional or statu-
tory right to a ‘perfect’ defense, fundamental fairness requires that ap-
pointed counsel exercise professional skill and judgment.”162  Although 
this standard is similar to the adequate-counsel inquiry Strickland estab-
lished, the presumption of attorney competence is noticeably absent in 
Geist.163  Also similar to Strickland, Oregon’s standard purports to require 
the claimant to show prejudice.164  Examining two Oregon Court of Ap-
 
158 Cole, supra note 12, at 114. 
159 See Calkins, supra note 20, at 216-18 (examining the standard established in 
State ex rel. Juvenile Department of Multnomah County v. Geist (In re Geist), 796 P.2d 1193 
(Or. 1990)). 
160 Id. at 216-17 (quoting Geist, 796 P.2d at 1201, 1203). 
161 Id. at 217. 
162 Geist, 796 P.2d at 1203 (citation omitted) (quoting Krummacher v. Gierloff, 627 
P.2d 458, 464 (Or. 1981) (in banc)). 
163 See Calkins, supra note 20, at 223 (“Strickland calls for a ‘strong’ presumption 
that counsel’s performance was adequate, with a ‘highly deferential’ review of the at-
torney’s performance, whereas Geist does not mention any presumption of adequacy.” 
(footnote omitted) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984))). 
164 See id. at 218 (“Geist requires a showing that the attorney’s performance denied 
the parent a fair trial and is sufficiently poor to call the trial court’s decision ‘into se-
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peals cases,165 as well as opinions from several other state courts that 
have adopted the fundamental-fairness approach,166 Associate Justice 
Calkins concludes that, in practice, the fundamental-fairness standard’s 
prejudice prong is less demanding on claimants, and therefore the test 
in operation is stricter on attorney error than is Strickland.167 
The strength of the fundamental-fairness standard, however, is  
also its weakness with regard to potential widespread adoption:  “It 
can . . . be seen as more flexible because it is less doctrinaire than the 
Strickland standard.”168  By applying a more amorphous test, the fun-
damental-fairness standard may be better at achieving justice, both 
substantive and procedural, than Strickland.  But these gains may come 
at the cost of the “secondary goals” Associate Justice Calkins identifies.  
The flood of ineffectiveness claims that became the norm in criminal 
appeals may besiege the civil justice system if courts adopt a standard 
that is more vague than Strickland.  Although interest in finality should 
not be placed above the goal of achieving justice, courts are not likely 
to look favorably on the fundamental-fairness standard if it opens the 
floodgates to ineffectiveness claims, especially if the expansion of the 
right to civil counsel brings additional cases into the civil justice system. 
C.  Pre- and Post-Strickland Alternatives in the Criminal Context 
Standards that either existed before the Supreme Court estab-
lished the current Strickland standard or were developed by states that 
declined to adopt Strickland offer viable alternatives for the civil con-
 
rious question.’  Furthermore, the trial court’s decision terminating parental rights 
should not be reversed if the reviewing court is satisfied that even with adequate coun-
sel the result would ‘inevitably’ have been the same.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting 
Geist, 796 P.2d at 1204)). 
165 See State ex rel. State Office for Servs. to Children & Families v. Thomas (In re 
Stephens), 12 P.3d 537, 543-44 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (applying the fundamental-fairness 
standard to find the father’s counsel inadequate due to a lack of preparation and a 
failure to advocate a theory for the father against termination); State ex rel. State Office 
for Servs. to Children & Families v. Rogers (In re Eldridge), 986 P.2d 726, 731 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1999) (finding the mother’s counsel’s inadequacy fundamentally unfair in part 
because counsel’s attempts at working with her were “half-hearted, at best”). 
166 See, e.g., Johnson v. J.K.C, Sr. (In re Interest of J.C., Jr.), 781 S.W.2d 226, 228 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (adopting a “relaxed” standard for ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claims in civil proceedings requiring attorneys to be “effective in providing a mea-
ningful hearing”). 
167 See Calkins, supra note 20, at 233 (“[T]he fundamental-fairness standard seems 
likely to raise the level of attorney competence because it makes counsel more respon-
sible for ensuring that the parents receive a fair trial.”). 
168 Id. 
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text by establishing a stricter test for effectiveness while still preserving 
the judiciary’s interest in finality.  Pre-Strickland, the majority of courts 
adopted some form of the two-prong test.169  Although most “applied a 
kind of ‘malpractice’ standard” for the performance prong, some 
“adopted instead a ‘guidelines’ approach, in which they tested the law-
yer’s conduct against a set of minimal duties or guidelines.”170  Scholarly 
commentators “virtually universally preferred the guidelines ap-
proach, because it was more susceptible to objective application and 
gave clear notice to attorneys and courts as to what was demanded.”171  
Regarding the prejudice prong, “[t]he vast majority of the 
courts . . . required a showing that the counsel’s deficient perfor-
mance impaired the defense in a material way,” and some put the 
burden for the prejudice prong on the government rather than the 
defendant, “maintaining that once a defendant showed that his attor-
ney’s performance was deficient, the government bore the burden of 
showing that the deficiency did not affect the result, much as the  
government must show ‘harmless error’ when defendants identify 
other constitutional defects in their prosecution.”172 
Hawaii serves as an example of a state that declined to adopt 
Strickland.  Pre-Strickland, Hawaii followed the majority position on the 
two-prong approach, requiring the defendant to show that counsel 
made “specific errors or omissions . . . reflecting counsel’s lack of skill, 
judgment or diligence” and “that these errors or omissions resulted in 
either the withdrawal or substantial impairment of a potentially meri-
torious defense.”173  After Strickland, the Supreme Court of Hawaii de-
cided to continue this approach on state grounds after noting that 
“the Strickland test has been criticized as being unduly difficult for a de-
fendant to meet.”174  Although Hawaii was not among the minority of 
jurisdictions to place the burden of demonstrating absence of prejudice 
on the government, the burden on the defendant to show “withdrawal 
or substantial impairment of a potentially meritorious defense” appears 
easier to satisfy than the “but for” causation required by Strickland.  The 
“performance” standard is not significantly different from that in Strick-
 
169 See Cole, supra note 12, at 111 (“[T]he vast majority [of courts] . . . adopted a 
test that looked at two considerations:  the attorney’s performance; and the effect of 
the attorney’s performance, often referred to as ‘prejudice.’”). 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 112. 
173 State v. Antone, 615 P.2d 101, 104 (Haw. 1980). 
174 State v. Smith, 712 P.2d 496, 500 n.7 (Haw. 1986). 
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land, but, like Oregon’s Geist standard, Hawaii’s approach does not  
establish a presumption of attorney competence that the defendant 
must overcome.  Therefore, the same criticism concerning finality ap-
plies:  the vagueness of the standard for competence will not discourage 
losing parties from filing ineffectiveness claims on appeal. 
Establishing a standard for ineffectiveness claims based on profes-
sional guidelines—a pre-Strickland approach that commentators fa-
vored at the time—is the best alternative to Strickland for ineffective-
ness claims in the civil context for three reasons.  First, articulating 
minimum standards will help raise the bar for effective advocacy, while 
avoiding the finality problems of other approaches.  By providing  
objective standards by which to measure counsel’s performance, 
courts will provide better notice to potential appellants about what 
courts consider to be inadequate representation.  Although the Strick-
land Court feared that using a guidelines-based approach would dis-
courage lawyers from providing aggressive and zealous advocacy for 
their clients, prior accounts of abysmal lawyering in the absence of any 
such standard and the current virtual impossibility of a successful inef-
fectiveness claim suggest that indigent litigants would be no worse off 
under a guidelines approach than they are now.  Even if standards 
discourage some lawyers from doing little beyond the bare minimum, 
at least such a minimum would be defined. 
Second, like the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice used by pre-
Strickland courts as guidelines for assessing attorney performance, 
there are several “civil-side standards, developed by the American Bar 
Association, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association and 
other standard-setting bodies, that can serve as a useful guide to 
states.”175  There are not civil standards for all areas where attorneys 
 
175 Abel, supra note 18, at 549.  For the particular examples that Abel notes, see SEC-
TION OF FAMILY LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS 
REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CUSTODY CASES (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
family/reports/standards_childcustody.pdf; SECTION OF FAMILY LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEG-
LECT CASES (1996), available at http://www.abanet.org/family/reports/standards_ 
abuseneglect.pdf; and NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, GUIDELINES FOR INVOLUNTARY 
CIVIL COMMITMENT (1986), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/ 
KIS_MenHeaGuideInvolCCtmt.pdf.  Recently, the ABA published a set of guidelines for 
lawyers representing clients in civil protection order cases.  See generally COMM’N ON 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS 
REPRESENTING VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, SEXUAL ASSAULT AND STALKING IN CIV-
IL PROTECTION ORDER CASES (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/domviol/ 
docs/StandardsCommentary.pdf (reiterating the need for victims to obtain civil protec-
tion orders and providing guidance to lawyers representing them in pursuit thereof).   
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may be appointed to represent indigent litigants, and that the ABA 
and similar organizations should develop such standards as the Civil 
Gideon movement progresses.176  In this vein, the ABA recently pub-
lished Standards for the Provision of Civil Legal Aid,177 which contains 
standards for practitioners that courts could use to fashion a guideline 
alternative to Strickland.178 
Third, recent Supreme Court opinions suggest that the current 
Court may be more accepting of a guidelines-based approach than was 
the Strickland Court.  In a series of death penalty appeals—Williams v. 
Taylor,179 Wiggins v. Smith,180 and Rompilla v. Beard181—the  Supreme 
Court revived the notion “that the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 
should be used as norms for determining what is objectively reasonable 
representation.”182  All of the cases involved “a challenge to trial coun-
sel’s investigation in a capital case,” and the Supreme Court found inef-
fective assistance of counsel in all three.183  In all three opinions, the ma-
jority “quoted extensively from the ABA standards” in arriving at its 
determination of inadequate representation.184  Significantly, Justice 
O’Connor, who authored the majority opinion rejecting a guidelines 
approach in Strickland, authored the Wiggins opinion and “provided the 
essential fifth vote in Williams,” strongly suggesting that “the Court in-
tentionally changed course.”185 
 
176 See Abel, supra note 18, at 549 (recognizing that “there are no national stan-
dards for some types of civil cases in which counsel are currently appointed” and as-
serting that “[a]ny expansion of the right to counsel in civil cases should be accompa-
nied by the development of standards for counsel in that kind of case”).  
177 STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
STANDARDS FOR THE PROVISION OF CIVIL LEGAL AID (2006), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/downloads/civillegalaidstds2007.pdf. 
178 See id. at 209-68 (articulating standards for, among other things, client partici-
pation, investigation, legal counseling, negotiation, and litigation strategy). 
179 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
180 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
181 545 U.S. 374 (2005).  
182 John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, “It’s Like Deja Vu All Over Again”:  Wil-
liams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guide-
lines Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 129 (2007). 
183 Id. at 146-47. 
184 Id. at 147. 
185 Id. at 149-50.  Blume and Neumann also note that all three cases were go-
verned by a provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006), meaning that “[i]n order to grant the writs of habeas cor-
pus, the Court had to conclude that the lower state courts’ decisions that trial counsel’s 
performance had not been objectively unreasonable were themselves objectively un-
reasonable.”  Blume & Neumann, supra note 182, at 151.  Such a finding appears to 
depart from the “strong presumption” of attorney competence articulated in Strickland. 
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Although the Court appeared to retreat from its support of the ABA 
guidelines in the recent opinion in Bobby v. Van Hook, the Court did not 
close the door to an effectiveness of counsel approach that uses ABA 
guidelines.186  In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Sixth 
Circuit erred by treating the 131-page ABA guidelines, published in 
2003, as instrumental in finding that a death row inmate’s lawyer pro-
vided ineffective assistance of counsel in a 1985 sentencing hearing.187  
Apart from the anachronism of the approach, the Court took issue with 
the appellate court’s treatment of “the ABA’s 2003 Guidelines not 
merely as evidence of what reasonably diligent attorneys would do, but 
as inexorable commands with which all capital counsel ‘must fully 
comply.’”188  The Court, however, noted that it was not ruling on a 
“less categorical” use of the ABA guidelines,189 leaving open the possi-
bility that a guidelines-based approach to effectiveness of counsel will 
continue to develop.  If these cases signal a change in the direction of 
the Court’s jurisprudence on effectiveness of counsel claims,190 then 
the Civil Gideon movement may be positioned to circumvent Strickland. 
CONCLUSION 
In the summer of 2010, the ABA adopted the Model Access Act, a 
model statute intended to aid states in passing legislation to expand 
access to appointed counsel according to the goal set forth by ABA  
Resolution 112A four years ago.191  Although not preclusive of litigation 
strategies, this Model Act strongly suggests that expanded access to 
counsel in civil cases will arrive through legislation rather than litiga-
tion.  As Gideon’s experience suggests, however, states’ adoption of this 
type of act will not be a panacea for indigent civil litigants.  Appellate 
standards for effectiveness of counsel will play an important role in  
determining the extent of the right and the amount of funding a state 
needs to provide this type of counsel to litigants.  A guidelines-based 
 
186 Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13 (2009). 
187 See id. at 17. 
188 Id. (quoting Dickerson v. Bagley, 453 F.3d 690, 693 (6th Cir. 2006)) (citing Van 
Hook v. Anderson, 560 F.3d 523, 526 (6th Cir. 2009)). 
189 Id. at 17 n.1. 
190 See Blume & Neumann, supra note 182, at 164 (“Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla 
mark a significant step forward in ineffective assistance of counsel litigation.”). 
191 See AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, MODEL ACCESS ACT 
§ 3(A) (2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/downloads/ 
104_Revised_FINAL_Aug_2010.pdf (“[P]ublic legal services shall be available at State 
expense, upon application by a financially-eligible person, in any adversarial proceed-
ing . . . in which basic human needs . . . are at stake.”). 
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standard, used by many courts pre-Strickland and in recent Supreme 
Court death penalty cases, is the best alternative for ensuring that the 
interests of justice are served in a way that does not unduly tax the judi-
cial system with a flood of civil appeals.  Fortunately, the Civil Gideon 
movement is still in its infancy, giving the ABA an opportunity to shape 
the coming debate in order to achieve an effective Civil Gideon. 
 
